and ensure safety while changing between automated and manual modes. 34 HF research should particularly address interactions between AVs, human 35 drivers, and vulnerable road users. Additionally, driver training programs 36 may have to be modified to ensure that humans are capable of using AVs. 37
Finally, a reflection on the interviews is provided, showing discordance 38 between the interviewees' statements-which appear to be in line with a 39 long history of human factors research, and the rapid development of 40 automation technology. We expect our perspective to be instrumental for 41 stakeholders involved in AV development and instructive to other parties. Automated driving technology has the potential to fundamentally change road 3 transportation and improve quality of life. Automated vehicles (AVs) are anticipated to 4 reduce the number of accidents caused by human errors, increase traffic flow efficiency, 5 increase comfort by allowing the driver to perform alternative tasks, and ensure mobility 6 for all, including old and impaired individuals (Fagnant and Kockelman 2015; Mui and 7 Carroll 2013) . 8
AVs can be classified according to their technological capabilities and human 9 engagement, ranging from manual driving, where the human driver executes all of the 10 driving tasks, to fully automated driving where no human interaction occurs. In this 11 paper, we adopt the SAE levels of automation (SAE International 2014; shown in 12 Table 1 , which is arguably the most well-known and broadly used taxonomy in the field 13 of automated driving research (International Transport Forum 2015; NHTSA 2016) . 14 15 A driver assistance system performs either steering or acceleration/deceleration, while the human driver is expected to carry out the remaining aspects of the dynamic driving task
2: Partial automation
One or more driver assistance systems perform both steering and acceleration/deceleration, while the human driver is expected to carry out all remaining aspects of the dynamic driving task Automated driving system 3: Conditional automation
An automated driving system performs all aspects of the dynamic driving task (in conditions for which it was designed), but the human driver is expected to respond appropriately to a request to intervene
4: High automation
An automated driving system performs all aspects of the dynamic driving task (in conditions for which it was designed), even if the human driver does not respond appropriately to a request to intervene
5: Full automation
An automated driving system performs all aspects of the dynamic driving task under all roadway and environmental conditions 1
There are suggestions that Levels 3 and 4 automation could be deployed by 2020 2 (ERTRAC Task Force and Connectivity and Automated Driving 2015), while Tesla 3 announced the introduction of an automated feature that will allow individuals to 4 summon their vehicles from a distance by 2018 (Blum 2016; Korosec 2015) . Moreover, 5 a recent study suggests that the public expects Level 5 (full) automation in more than 6 50% of vehicles by around 2030 (Kyriakidis, Happee, and De Winter 2015) . 7
Along this accelerating evolution of road vehicle automation, Human Factors (HF) 8 research scientists have warned for a long time that the mere fact that you can 9 automate does not mean that you should (Fitts 1951; Hancock 2014) . As early as 1983, 10
Bainbridge (1983) presented several 'ironies of automation' and explained that "the 11 more advanced a control system is, so the more crucial may be the contribution of the 12 human operator." Similarly, Parasuraman and Riley (1997) explained the importance of 13 studying how humans may misuse, disuse, and abuse automation technology, and also 14 argued that humans tend to be poor supervisors of automation. With respect to AVs in 15 particular, up to Level 4 automation, human drivers will be a key component, because 16 they should operate the vehicle in conditions not supported by the automation, and will 17 be expected (Level 4), or even required (Levels 2 and 3) to resume manual control when 18
needed. 19
Studies indicate that many challenges pertaining to the interaction between human 20 drivers and automated systems are yet to be resolved. Such challenges include the 21 impact of automated systems on drivers' mental workload and situation awareness 22 (Brookhuis et al. 2008; Kaber and Endsley 2004; 23 Salmon, Stanton, and Young 2012; Stanton and Young 2005; Whitmore and Reed 2015) , 24 as well as the human drivers' levels of acceptance (Brookhuis et al. 2008) , trust, and 25 reliance on the automated systems (Coelingh 2013; De Waard et al. 1999; Fisher, Reed, 26 and Savirimuthu 2015; Verberne, Ham, and Midden 2012) . 27
Further challenges are associated with potential changes in human drivers' behaviour 28 due to automation (Gouy et al. 2014) , the necessary skills that the humans should retain 29 to perform the driving task manually (Vlakveld 2015) , and the role of the humans in the 30 case of an emergency such as when automation fails or exceeds its functional limits 1 (Levitan, Golembiewski, and Bloomfield 1998) . In addition, research has yet to clarify 2 the required level of supervisory control and cooperation (who is performing what part 3 of the driving task) between human drivers and automated systems (Banks and Stanton 4 2016; Coelingh 2013; Hoc, Young and Blosseville 2009; Lu et al. 2016; Marinik et al. 5 2014) . 6
Research challenges also comprise the estimation of the minimum time required by 7 human drivers to resume manual control when instructed by the automated system 8 (Gold et al. 2013 (Gold et al. , 2016 Merat et al. 2014; Mok et al. 2015; Radlmayr et al. 2014; 9 Schieben et al. 2008; Zeeb, Buchner, and Schrauf 2015) , and the interaction between 10
AVs and other vehicles and road users Van den Beukel 2013, Merat and 11 Lee 2012; Merat et al., submitted; Madigan et al., 2016) . Finally, as argued by Hancock 12 (2015, p. 139) , "one empirical question that necessitates vital research at this present 13 time is the establishment of appropriate epidemiological baselines for the dimensions 14 of current, manually-operated vehicle performance such as transit time efficiency, 15 system downtime, injury and fatality". 16 Therefore, HF research can critically contribute to the development and deployment 17 of AVs, by working towards a synergy between the human driver, vehicle, and 18 environment. This paper presents the findings of an interview study with twelve 19 researchers in the field of HF and automated driving. The aim of the study was twofold: 20 first, to define the most critical HF challenges related to AVs, and second, to indicate 21 similarities and distinctive perspectives among the researchers. 22
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, we will describe the 23 methods of the study, with subsequent sections providing a summary of the 24 researchers' opinions in the form of twelve narratives. Finally, we discuss parallels and 25 idiosyncrasies regarding the opinions of the interviewees, and provide concluding 26 remarks and suggestions for policy makers and other stakeholders. 27
28

Methods
30
Using a 35-item questionnaire interview (provided in the Appendix), the twelve 31 researchers articulated their expectations, concerns, and vision about AVs. The 32 these narratives, the researchers then recomposed and finalized their statements, as 23 presented in the next section. 24 25
Researchers' opinions 26 27
Neville Stanton 28
Decades of research have shown that humans are not particularly good at tasks that 29 require vigilance and sustained attention over long periods of time (Warm, 30 Parasuraman, and Matthews 2008) . Today, one of the major challenges in the design of 31
AVs is the expectation that drivers will monitor the system constantly and appropriately 32 intervene when required (Stanton, Young, and McCaulder 1997) . Experience from other 1 industries, such as aviation, has shown that automation may actually cause as many 2 problems as it solves. For example, the disconnection of the autopilot on Air France 3 Flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris (which crashed on 1 June 2009, BEA 2012) failed 4 to communicate the nature of the situation (the blocking of pitot tubes with ice crystals) 5 effectively to the human pilots. The resultant inputs from the pilots led the aircraft into 6 an aerodynamic stall, from which it did not recover. The black box voice recorder makes 7 for chilling reading, as the pilots struggled to regain control of the aircraft. 8
There is concern that AVs could cause similar confusion in drivers, where the drivers' 9 understanding of the situation is at odds with reality (Stanton, Dunoyer, and Leatherland 10 2011) . Whilst in aviation, people are beginning to wise up to the fact that automation is 11 causing confusion in pilots (which has been called a 'mode error' in the technical 12 literature (Sarter and Woods 1995) , there is still an assumption that the driver will be 13 the last line of defence in AVs. Despite two decades of research on AVs, there is still 14 much to be learnt. HF research can play a substantial role in the development of our 15 understanding of driving AVs by reproducing a range of situations in simulators. Here 16 we can observe how drivers are likely to behave as well as get feedback on their 17 experience. 18
Research should be focusing on maintaining the communication and interaction 19 between AVs and the driver. Unless a system can be designed that requires no human 20 input at all (and has no controls within the vehicle) we need to design automation that 21 supports, rather than replaces, human drivers. To some extent, supportive automation 22 is already with us, such as Antilock Braking Systems, Lane Keeping Systems, and 23
Electronic Stability Control (Stanton and Young 2005) . These systems can be thought of 24 as a background automation rather than foreground automation (where the latter takes 25 over the driving tasks). Background automation allows the driver to drive the vehicle, 26 but watches over them in case of trouble (Young, Stanton, and Harris 2007) . If the driver 27 brakes too hard, strays out of the lane, or steers too hard, the automation will intervene 28 in an attempt to save them. Automated Emergency Braking Systems are an extension of 29 this philosophy, and will brake if the sensors detect an impending accident without any 30 intervention from the driver. 31
As a cautionary note, with creeping automation taking a more active role in driving, 1 there are some very salient lessons to be learnt from aviation. This can be illustrated 2 using the difference between the automation philosophies in Boeing and Airbus. In 3 Boeing the pilot is king. Although there is a protective layer of automation, this can be 4 overridden by the pilots. By way of contrast, in the Airbus the computer is king, and the 5 pilots cannot override this protective layer of automation in normal law mode. Whilst it 6 is acknowledged that the automation does protect pilots, it can also cause problems as 7
shown with the AF447. In this incident, the aircraft entered alternate law mode 8 (although the pilots did not realize this mode change) (BEA 2012) . In addition, the flight 9 controls in the Airbus do not have any feedback (they do in the Boeing), so do not move 10 at all when the autopilot is in control (whereas they do in the Boeing). Each pilot did not 11 realize that the other was making control inputs. This would be equivalent to the 12 steering wheel not moving in a car that is being driven automatically, certainly not 13 something I would advise to vehicle manufacturers. 14 Overall, automated vehicles are meaningful only if drivers are freed from the driving 15 tasks, are not anticipated to supervise the system, and are not liable for it. We are, 16 however, rather far from reaching this point (Walker, Stanton, and Salmon 2015) . 17 Accordingly, it might be more beneficial for the society if research focuses on 18 background automation, until foreground automation has matured sufficiently. 19
20
Thierry Bellet 21
Almost twenty-five years ago, the US Automated Highway System (AHS) program was 22 launched to conduct long-range research on the design of future Intelligent 23
Transportation Systems aimed at aiding driving, enhancing the capacity and efficiency 24 of the highway system, and assisting transportation agencies in managing their facilities 25 and controlling traffic (Bement et al. 1998) . 26
One of the program's main findings was the unclear extent to which human drivers 27 would accept reduced manual control of their vehicles or be willing to travel in 28 automated vehicles at close following distances, on narrower lanes, and at higher 29 speeds (Bement et al. 1998) . The program also showed that improving road safety and 30 increasing road capacity might not be mutually compatible unless society accepts the 31 idea of "automation responsibility" in the case of accidents (Bellet et al. 2003) . If not, 1 the human drivers may be required to remain alert and take back the control of their 2 vehicles in the case of critical situations. Subsequently, increased safety margins and a 3 reduction of vehicle speeds are required to allow drivers to rebuild their situation 4 awareness and adequately resume control of the driving task. However, this would 5 mean that AVs, compared to manual driving, would actually reduce road capacity. 6 Therefore, the program concluded that although there are no technical showstoppers 7 for the overall success of an automated highway system, legal and societal challenges 8 may be more difficult to resolve, including rejecting the founding paradigm of the driving 9 task, where responsibility lies with the human driver (Lay, McHale, and Stevens 1996) . 10
Recent developments in AVs have changed the situation. AVs, although in limited 11 numbers, now exist. It is not a question of whether it is possible to have AVs on the 12 public roads. It is a question of how, when, and under which conditions they should be 13 introduced. Of course, the famous Bainbridge's (1983) 'ironies of automation' remain 14 exactly the same, but now the time has come to propose solutions to these ironies. 15
Today the main challenge is not to consider the future, but to think about the present. 16
Facing this challenge, HF research has to clearly define the role of humans in AVs (is the 17 human still technically a driver), and to support accordingly the design of a human-18 centred automation. Synthetically, three main options seem promising: (1) developing 19 co-piloting systems supporting the driver rather than replacing them, (2) designing 20 solutions to keep humans in the loop of control during automation, in order to support 21 situation awareness, (3) defining dedicated areas for full automation without any 22 responsibility of the driver (e.g., dedicated lane on highways, or platooning for long 23 tunnels). 24
However, to support such human-centred design of automation, new simulation 25 tools are required, from realistic AV simulators allowing full-scale immersive tests, to 26 traffic flow simulations including realistic human driver models that are able to predict 27 the road safety effects of AVs (Bellet et al. 2012) . Such simulation tools could allow us 28 to test different types of AVs, support decision-making regarding policy and legislation, 29
and finally permit the introduction of AVs on public roads and their potential 30 deployment during the next 20 years. 31
Bart van Arem 1
The deployment of automated vehicles will eventually change road transportation as 2 it stands today. However, AVs that are able to drive in all situations and at all conditions, 3 without requiring any human supervision or intervention, will not be introduced into the 4 market any time soon. 5 Nevertheless, I believe that within the next 10 years AVs could be deployed on public 6 roads for specific scenarios (e.g., highway driving). The human drivers in those vehicles 7 will then be supervising the system and intervene if required. 8
Research, therefore, should aim at ensuring that the human drivers remain alert and 9 situational aware, even when they are not actively controlling the steering wheel and 10 pedals. This level of automation, however, will not allow the drivers to be engaged in a 11 large variety of non-driving tasks. This means that the benefits for the consumers as well 12
as their acceptance and willingness to buy such AVs are limited. 13
Thus, our resources should be focusing on highly automated driving, which will 14 enable a driver to engage in non-driving tasks, and which is equipped with fail safe 15 strategies, including a feature that brings the car to a minimal risk condition (cf. SAE, 16
2016). 17 18
Karel Brookhuis 19
Human beings notoriously get bad marks in (low frequency) vigilance tasks, that is, 20 detecting occasional mishaps. The poor human ability to monitor and supervise 21 represents a major weakness of automated vehicles in general, and specifically at the 22 SAE Level 2, since it will be mandatory for human 'drivers' to keep monitoring the system 23 and the environment. Since human drivers should primarily be supervising the system, 24 rather than engaging in any other activities, the benefits of AVs and in turn their 25 acceptance and the public willingness to use them, let alone buy them, are debatable, 26 whilst driver training and licensing will change dramatically. In order to maintain driving 27 skills, human drivers should keep having the opportunity to drive manually, probably 28 requiring AVs to stay fully equipped. 29
As system failures cannot be excluded, additional research should focus on four 30 topics: (1) to define the way in which human drivers should be informed in case of a 31 system failure, (2) depending on the type of failure, what the human driver is able and 1 allowed to do, (3) to optimize the safe interaction of the new technology with human 2 drivers, and (4) to ensure public acceptance and trust in automated vehicles. 3
The deployment of SAE Level 5, operating without any human intervention in all 4 situations and at all conditions, might even never happen, as people are reluctant to 5 accept any potential harm caused by a machine operating independently. A realistic and 6 fast way to deploy AVs is by employing segregated lanes, which will be controlled and 7 maintained by a separately managed infrastructure. In these lanes only authorized AVs 8 operating at SAE Level 4/5 will be allowed. 9
In conclusion, I am expecting AVs within the next 10 years, but only in a segregated 10 manner such as low speed vehicles on designated tracks for the transportation of goods. 11
For this to happen, the safety levels should be clearly demonstrated, while any potential 12 side effects that may arise from their deployment are adequately communicated to the 13 people involved and to society in general. 14 15
Marieke Martens 16
Automated vehicles in the next couple of years will have operational limitations, 17 being able to operate only under the specific conditions they can cope with. Once we 18 can prove that AVs are always able to cope with situations in an acceptable, safe, and 19 comfortable manner, the AVs may take over control, and the human drivers will become 20 passengers. Subsequently, liability issues could also be resolved, with the drivers 21 remaining liable for as long as they are in control of their vehicle, and the original 22 equipment manufacturers (OEMs) becoming liable once automation accepts the control 23 of the vehicle. 24
However, if AVs cannot cope with a situation, they will either hand over the control 25 to the human driver or they will come to an alternative solution such as a transition to 26 a minimal risk condition. This may include AV coming to a standstill (e.g., safe stop), 27 which may be dangerous if the AV does not explicitly communicate its intention to other 28 road users or does not come to safe stop in a predictable manner or at a predictable 29 location. 30 HF research should specifically focus on the transitions from automation to manual 1 driving, in order to ensure that the human driver will appropriately respond to the 2 request of their vehicle to take over control. Additionally, HF research should identify 3 the behaviour of AVs vehicles when automation is in control, in order for the passengers 4 to understand the vehicle's actions and to feel comfortable (i.e., no motion sickness; cf. 5 Diels and Bos 2016), and for other road users to understand and predict the AVs 6
intentions. This will ensure the maximal benefits in terms of safety, efficiency, comfort 7 and acceptance. 8
By elaborating current technology, the deployment of SAE Level 3 or AVs operating 9 on highways will be feasible within the next 5 years. I do not believe in SAE Level 2 (driver 10 monitoring the environment), since drivers are not able to pay attention to the road and 11 automation status across long periods. SAE Level 2 is suitable for testing and research 12 purposes, with expert drivers or technicians assessing the reliability of the automation, 13 in order to verify readiness for SAE Level 3. Yet, a lot of testing is required to confirm the 14 safe operation of AVs in different types of conditions, and to understand the operational 15 envelope of automation. SAE Level 2 systems as we currently see introduced on the 16 market will only work well if their reliability is actually 'Level 3 ready'. 17
The deployment of SAE Level 5 in mixed traffic conditions may never happen at 18 acceptable levels. AVs may have to operate at very low speeds in order to meet 19 appropriate safety requirements, making these vehicles particularly slow in city 20 environments. However, such AVs could be introduced for specific scenarios and types 21 of operation, such as public transportation. 22
23
Klaus Bengler 24
Automated driving should not become a hype topic; its presentation nowadays 25 sometimes may be too visionary and confusing/distorting for the public. It is rather 26 unrealistic, for example, to expect SAE Level 5 automated vehicles soon on public roads. 27
However, it could indeed be possible to introduce fully automated driving vehicles 28 operating at low speeds in segregated lanes supported by infrastructure for specific 29 scenarios. Examples of such applications can be found in public transport or the 30 transportation of goods. 31
It is important, therefore, to clearly define the functionalities and the range of 1 applicability of automated vehicles. Based on the current technological and 2 infrastructural capabilities, automated driving could only be a fraction of individuals' 3 daily mobility. At present, SAE Levels 4 or 5 AVs can only be applied in very specific 4 scenarios, such as low speeds and specific areas. 5
In the future, AVs may be able to operate at higher SAE automation levels. In such 6 vehicles, the mode of driving can be selected based on the situation and conditions at 7 each particular time of the operation. In other words, the human drivers could remain 8 drivers, supervisors of automation, or passengers, depending on the mode of 9 automation. In those vehicles, new families of input elements can be introduced, yet 10 steering wheels have many advantages, such as clear visual feedback regarding 11 direction. 12
AVs will be designed to obey the traffic rules in all cases, and therefore the fluency of 13 their interaction with other vehicles and road users, as well as their acceptance by the 14 public, is a big topic. 15
Within this context, HF research has four main tasks. First, to define the acceptance 16 criteria of human drivers regarding the automated driving functionalities. Second, to 17 determine the individual capabilities of human drivers when using AVs (e.g., situation 18 awareness, reaction times), and in turn to ensure safety while changing driving modes. 19
Today, for instance, humans driving manually are able to look outside their windows or 20 to the dashboard for a small period of time without a problem. It is unrealistic to expect 21 that human drivers will constantly monitor the automation system. Rather it could make 22 sense, to define a period that the drivers could divert their view away from the 23 automated system. Third, to provide design solutions regarding the interfaces installed 24 in AVs and their interaction with the human drivers. Finally, to investigate the 25 interaction and communication between AVs and conventional cars and other road 26 users. AVs will be deployed on the market only if they are proven to be safe, and all the 27 relevant liability issues are resolved. 28
29
Jan Andersson 1
Automated vehicles can eventually change the status of road transportation, 2 including the use and ownership of vehicles. From a safety, mobility, and traffic 3 perspective the focus on developing and directly deploying SAE Level 5 AVs would be 4 the most beneficial, as the majority of the human factors and legal challenges associated 5 with the SAE Levels 2, 3 and 4 AVs would be avoided. Yet, it is more realistic to expect a 6 gradual deployment of SAE Levels 2, 3 and 4 AVs, which will introduce different levels of 7 functionalities and applicability. 8
The main weaknesses of these automation levels, however, are the expectation that 9 human drivers intervene upon a request by the automation, in addition to the liability 10 uncertainties. Who would like to use automation if they remain liable at all times for a 11 system that they partially cannot control? 12 HF researchers need, therefore, to understand how people will be using the 13 automated functionalities, in order to ensure a smooth process for the human drivers 14 to regain control of the vehicle. Research has proven that people are poor in monitoring 15 a technological system (e.g., Endsley 1996), or staying alert when not being engaged to 16 the driving task, and we should be aware of this when the liability criteria are 17 determined by legislators. It is crucial, therefore, to define the minimum time 18 requirements for human drivers to return back in the control loop, for several different 19 driving scenarios. For this, research would first have to define the human driver's mind-20 set, and whether bringing them into the loop is a cognitive or a decision-making aspect. 21
Furthermore, it is important to define the type and frequency of information that human 22 drivers should be receiving in order to facilitate and maintain their situation awareness, 23 primarily when they are not engaged to the driving task. 24
In addition, HF research must determine how people using other transport modes or 25 conventional vehicles, and vulnerable road users will be interacting with AVs, and to 26 confirm that the human drivers and all road users are aware of the automated systems' 27 capabilities and limitations. 28
29
Natasha Merat 1
The main concerns and worries towards deployment of automated vehicles are 2 currently associated with automation SAE Levels 2 and 3. All relevant stakeholders agree 3 that it is very difficult to establish and ensure whether or not a human driver is aware of 4 the automated system performance, and research suggests that humans may generally 5 be poor supervisors of automation in such circumstances (Parasuraman 1987) . 6
Subsequently, it is hard to define the appropriate time that humans need to regain 7 control of a vehicle during a specific situation, and to confirm that upon regaining 8 control they respond in a safe and appropriate manner (Merat et al. 2014) . As long as 9 the design of AVs allows human intervention, the impact on safety of road 10 transportation is debatable. 11
The general public should also be aware that we are far from ready to deploy AVs 12 capable of operating in all environments and scenarios without any human intervention. 13
It is therefore more likely that the first AVs will only be operating in dedicated lanes, for 14 specific driving scenarios. 15
One of today's biggest challenges is to verify that the human drivers are aware of the 16 AV's limitations, in order to resume control when required, whilst also remaining free 17 to engage in other activities, beyond driving. Otherwise, if drivers' main task in an AV is 18 to observe and monitor the vehicle and its operation, the benefits of automation to 19 consumers are minimal. 20 Therefore, for the next 5 to 10 years, research is likely to focus more on providing 21 solutions for maintaining human drivers' situation awareness, mainly when they are not 22 engaged in the driving task. In addition to ensuring that AVs (including their computers 23 and sensors) are functioning reliably, improvements in the design and performance of 24
HMIs are required to establish the type and amount of information that drivers should 25 receive in order to cope with any unexpected situation (Merat and Lee 2012) . 26
The long-term potential benefits of AVs on safety, time and traffic efficiency, 27 mobility, and pollution can be enormous. Yet, all relevant stakeholders have to be 28 modest and avoid confusing the public by raising unrealistic expectations. Indeed, it 29 might be possible to have vehicles with automated functionalities on public roads within 30 the next 10 to 15 years. However, it is rather likely that the cost and maintenance of 31 such vehicles will be quite high, which will be a major barrier towards their deployment 1 and acceptance by the majority of the public. 2 3
Nick Reed 4
Today, challenges towards the introduction of automated vehicles are associated 5 with levels of automation that rely on the human drivers. Although it is feasible to 6 deploy conditional automated driving vehicles (SAE Level 3), the expectation that a 7 human driver can remain alert and rapidly regain situational awareness following a 8 request by the system is unrealistic. However, if AVs become capable of safely dealing 9 with a human driver failing to respond to a request to intervene, then fully automated 10 vehicles cannot be far behind. Research has first to determine a safe and effective 11 process for re-engaging the driver back in the loop. Second, to educate human drivers 12 on system capabilities and expected actions; and thirdly, to explore tendencies for 13 drivers to use automation and adapt their driving behaviour to particular circumstances 14 of a journey. 15
Current technology suggests that deployment of low speed automated vehicles 16 operating without human intervention on dedicated routes for specific purposes, such 17 as public transport, may be possible within three years. Once the technology is mature 18 enough to support fully automated vehicles, car ownership and vehicle usage patterns 19 will change. Today, a car is often the second biggest investment a person makes yet will 20 typically be parked the majority of the time. There is also a trend for younger people to 21 reject car ownership or license acquisition, probably associated with high insurance 22 costs for driving. SAE Level 4 and (eventually) Level 5 AVs make mass car sharing models 23 much more viable. As an on-demand service, people could choose a vehicle that is 24 appropriate for each individual, specific journey rather than owning an individual vehicle 25 that is compromised across an owner's various mobility needs. These shared AVs 26 present additional HF challenges such as how to design AVs that provide an enjoyable, 27 personalized travel experience for diverse customers and how vehicle interiors should 28 be redesigned to make journeys comfortable and pleasant without compromising 29 occupant safety. 30
31
Maxime Flament 1
The automation levels have been formulated as a common language. As technology 2 is advancing, we need to keep a critical eye and avoid getting stuck at an intermediate 3 level of automation. Indeed, today's HF research raises serious doubt as for the handing 4 over of the driving task associated with SAE Level 3. It is human nature that a driver, 5 who is relieved even briefly from their driving task, will engage to other distracting tasks. 6
From a liability standpoint, the industry will not introduce such a distracting system 7 unless the automation can bring the vehicle to a minimal risk condition if no driver 8 response is detected. For this reason, the SAE Level 3 AVs may just never come to the 9 market. 10 Adding confusion to the definitions, the same vehicle, depending on its environment 11 and its access to reliable information, could allow more than one level of automation. 12
The HF challenge in this case will be to clearly inform the driver about the possible levels 13 of automation at any given time and place, and why this is so. This will lead to trust and 14 acceptance of automation, but, too much trust may cause over-reliance together with 15 unintended use, misuse, and even abuse. In fact, the difficulty may come from other 16 road users: manual drivers, cyclists and pedestrians; knowing the AVs' capabilities, they 17 may take advantage of AVs in mixed traffic. The challenge for AVs will then be to keep 18 their place in traffic while guaranteeing reasonable safety. This should lead to innovative 19 ways to indicate the driving intentions to other road users. 20
AVs should firstly address critical situations caused by boredom and drowsiness, as 21 well as construction sites, intersections and other stressful areas. AVs could be on the 22 market within less than ten years, first on highways then gradually on other main roads, 23 supplemented with valet parking. 24
25
Marjan Hagenzieker 26
The role of human drivers is one of the main challenges when discussing automated 27 driving vehicles. In vehicles where human drivers are expected to intervene, the human 28 has to be both a driver and a supervisor. However, these two roles require different 29 training and skills, while they are not in tune. For instance, the less human drivers are 30 manually controlling their vehicles, the more their driving skills will deteriorate (e.g., 1 Dragutinovic et al. 2005) , which can be critical especially in the case of an emergency. 2 Therefore, HF research should determine the required skills of humans in order to 3 operate AVs, and to identify any changes in their driving behaviour. Moreover, research 4 has to define the necessary (re)action times for the types of situations and interventions 5 that drivers will be asked to perform. 6
In addition, research should assist in redesigning the current driver training 7 programs. On the one hand, the new programs have to ensure that human drivers are 8 always capable of performing the driving task. On the other hand, they must instruct 9 human drivers how to supervise automation, and to maintain their supervisory skills. 10 HF researchers also have to determine ways of communication between AVs with 11 human drivers, other vehicles, and vulnerable road users. In addition, research has to 12 determine the consequences of behaviour of AVs, which is potentially very different 13 compared to the manual driven vehicles. Such large differences in the behaviour of AVs 14 may impose additional demands on people who do not drive or use AVs. This could raise 15 questions on whether we should allow AVs to induce such demands to those who do 16 not own, drive, or use this technology. 17
For fully automated vehicles that do not require any human intervention, research 18 should focus on proving them safe and reliable. However, it is too optimistic to believe 19 that such vehicles will be able to operate in large scale mixed traffic in the foreseeable 20 future. Nevertheless, the deployment of AVs of SAE Levels 3 and 4 on specific stretches, 21 dedicated areas, and driving scenarios, such as highways, is feasible and could in the mid 22 and long term improve the safety of road transportation. 23
24
Riender Happee 25
Are we ready to deploy automated vehicles on public roads? Certainly not, as we still 26 have to prove them safe. On the one hand, the role of the human driver in AVs has not 27 been clearly defined. On the other hand, neither vehicle technology nor the 28 infrastructure is proven to be ready to support the deployment of automated vehicles 29 safely operating in real world traffic conditions. 30
Proving safety requires on-road and virtual testing to rigorously assess not only the 1 technology but also the human interaction with automation. The critical aspects of HF 2 to date have almost exclusively been tested in driving simulators . 3
Undoubtedly, driving simulators are valuable for gaining insight in human behaviour, 4 especially in safety-critical scenarios that cannot be easily tested on the public roads. 5
Yet, the results derived from simulator experiments do not necessarily reflect reality. It 6 is essential, therefore, to compare the behaviour of drivers in simulators with equivalent 7 studies on the public roads, in order to eventually build evaluation methods combining 8 simulator and on-road studies. 9
Testing procedures are required for sensing and control systems in order to 10 determine whether they operate reliably in complex real world driving conditions. HF 11 research should focus on establishing procedures to test and determine the safe 12 interaction between human drivers and automation, not only during transitions of 13 control, but also regarding the interaction of automated vehicles with other road users. 14 Hands-free driving is already commercially available with restrictions, and eyes-off-15 road driving may be possible and legal in the near future, in particular for highway 16 conditions. AVs can provide transitions to minimal risk condition (e.g., safe stop) if 17 human drivers do not take over when this is requested by the AV. Such minimal risk 18 strategies can prevent mishaps in the hopefully rare case that drivers are unfit to resume 19 control. However, as long as such take-over requests exists, and as long as drivers have 20 options to resume manual driving, we need to incorporate human factors analysis in the 21 safety assessment of automated driving. 22
23
Discussion 24
Comparison of the interviewees' statements 25 26
The interviews revealed a consensus regarding HF challenges that need to be 27 resolved prior to a wide-scale deployment of AVs on public roads, with a number of 28 distinctive remarks. 29
In line with recent position papers (Casner, Hutchins, and Norman 2016; Norman 30 2015; Poulin et al. 2015; Trimble et al. 2014) , the experts highlighted a complex 31 interaction between human drivers and SAE Level 2 and 3 automated vehicles. The 32 interviewees stressed that any automated system that removes the human from the 1 driving task, yet requires the human to monitor and supervise the system and regain 2 control when necessary, could be unsafe. In other words, one should not expect that 3 human drivers will always be able to regain control of their vehicles in a safe and 4 appropriate manner. Moreover, SAE Level 2 and 3 systems may not be welcomed by 5 drivers because the range of the permitted secondary tasks will be limited (e.g., NHTSA 6 2012). Thus, drivers may not be able to benefit from automation to a significant extent 7 (cf. Naujoks, Purucker, and Neukum 2016). 8
The researchers underpinned the importance of additional research on public 9 acceptance and trust in automation, the interaction of the AVs with other vehicles and 10 road users, and the amount and type of information that the human drivers shall be 11 receiving by the automated system. Finally, they referred to the need for additional 12 experiments to study human driver behaviour while operating in automated mode and 13 during transitions from manual to automated mode and vice versa, and to validate 14 findings from simulator experiments with equivalent studies on public roads. 15
Besides areas of wide agreement, the twelve researchers expressed distinctive 16 statements on different aspect of AVs, including legislation, cost of AVs, and type 17 approval challenges. The role of human drivers in AVs was discussed, and it was 18 suggested by several of the researchers that unless AVs (permanently) take over all 19 functions of the driving task, drivers should remain 'in the loop'. The issue of driving skill 20 degradation due to automation was raised, stating that training programs will have to 21 be modified, teaching human drivers about the automation's capabilities and expected 22
actions. 23
The issue of responsibility in the cases of accidents is a critical factor in AV 24 deployment, yielding a conflict between roadway capacity and roadway safety. 25
Specifically, it was stressed that when human drivers are expected to regain control of 26 their vehicles, large safety margins (i.e., separation between vehicles) will have to be 27 adopted, while engineers are developing platooning systems that operate with short 28 inter-vehicle headways. Nevertheless, it was stated that AVs could be broadly deployed 29 within the next 10 years with an operational design domain confined to highways and 30 similar roads, with the expectation that human drivers will resume manual control when 31 leaving the operational design domain.
It was stated that automation levels were formulated as a common language, but 1 that in reality the same AV (depending on its environment and access to reliable 2 information) may allow more than one level of automation. Finally, it was pointed out 3 that there is a need for testing procedures regarding sensing and control systems, in 4 order to determine whether AVs operate reliably in complex real-world driving 5 conditions. To this end, the Dutch Type Approval Authority has introduced an 6 amendment to the Exceptional Transport (Exemptions) Decree to facilitate testing and 7 development of autonomous vehicles on public roads (RDW 2014) . 8 9 Comparison of the interviewees' statements with the current state of AVs 10 deployment 11 12
In the interviews conducted in April and May 2015, the twelve researchers 13 commented extensively on HF related safety implications of Level 2 and 3 AVs, and some 14 specifically expressed that AVs should not be introduced on public roads unless proven 15
safe. However, reality shows that SAE Level 2 automation systems, and even systems 16 that are close to SAE Level 3 automation, have now been deployed. For example, in 17
October 2015 Tesla introduced an Autopilot feature that allows for minutes of hands-18 free driving, whereas as of October 2016, new cars are equipped with full self-driving 19 hardware (Tesla, 2016) . These observations illustrate that industry marches forward and 20 that there is a disconnect between academic research and industrial research and 21 development. Furthermore, it shows that even experts who work in the field of AVs may 22 underestimate the pace of development in some industries, regarding the introduction 23 of AVs on the market. 24
The interviewees agreed that we are far from ready to deploy fully (SAE Level 5) 25 automated vehicles on public roads, with several researchers claiming that fully AVs may 26 never operate at acceptable levels (Shladover 2016) . Instead, SAE Level 4 vehicles could 27 be introduced on specific routes, under certain conditions, and for distinct applications, 28 such as segregated areas, low speeds or high speeds on highways only, transport of 29 goods, or public transport. In agreement with the reviewers' expectations, the projects 30 CityMobil2 (2014b), GATEway (2014c), and WEpods (2014e) are currently 31 demonstrating the integration of autonomous transport systems into complex real 32 world urban environments. Such integration, however, may pose questions concerningthe interaction of vulnerable road users with AVs (Lundgren et al. 2017; Núñez Velasco 1 et al. 2016; Rothenbücher et al. 2016; Merat et al., submitted) . 2 3
Concluding remarks 4 5
AVs have the potential to substantially reform road transportation by increasing 6 safety and traffic flow efficiency (SAE Levels 3 to 5), and ensuring mobility for all (SAE 7 Level 5). It is no longer a question of whether it will be possible to have AVs on public 8
roads, but rather a question of how, when, and under which conditions. This paper 9 presents the perspective of twelve researchers in the field of HFs and AVs. 10
Findings indicate that, currently, the main challenge for the deployment of AVs is the 11 expectation of the human driver to intervene, after a period of not controlling the 12 steering wheel and pedals. Thus, research should focus on (a) designing AVs that can 13 inform their occupants about the vehicle's capabilities and operational status, as well as 14 about upcoming situations that the vehicles cannot solve. In addition, research should 15 (b) concentrate on defining the automation functionalities that the human drivers would 16 accept and use, and (c) determine the interaction between the human driver and 17 automation during transitions of control. Furthermore, research needs to (d) establish 18 procedures to test, determine, and ensure safety while changing from automated to 19 manual mode, and (e) investigate the interaction between AVs and human drivers, 20 conventional cars, and other road users such as cyclists and pedestrians. Finally, 21 research should (f) explore the modification of the current driver training programs so 22 that drivers are instructed how to use automation in a safe and acceptable manner. We 23 expect that these findings can be instrumental for stakeholders involved in the 24 development of automated driving technology and instructive to other parties. 25
For long-term successful deployment of the AVs all the relevant stakeholders 26 including the automotive industry, research institutes, policy makers, and governmental 27 bodies should work together to facilitate a safe deployment of AVs, not only taking 28 technology into account but also the human factors and the end user's perspective. As 29 Cummings (2016) stressed, the relevant policy makers and governmental bodies shall 30 provide leadership to overcome today's inadequate testing and evaluation programs of 31 the robotic self-driving cars. Cummings suggested that the automated driving 32 community could learn and follow practices from other domains, such as aviation. The 1 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for example, has explicit certification processes 2 for certifying aircraft software, and they would never allow commercial aircrafts to 3 execute automatic landings without verifiable test evidence. Similarly, road transport 4 governmental bodies worldwide may have to deny certification to self-driving cars, until 5 the industry provides greater transparency and reveals how they are conducting the 6 testing of their cars. Such an action, may hinder short-term deployment and innovation, 7 but could be essential for the long-term deployment and subsequently for the overall 8 safety improvement on public roads. 9
It may be argued that our concerns and recommendations hardly differ from early HF 10 lessons learned from aviation and other automation domains (e.g., Bainbridge, 1983; 11 Fitts, 1951; Parasuraman, 1987; Wickens et al., 1998) . For example, an early report on 12 HF for future air traffic control stated: "men, on the whole, are poor monitors. We 13 suggest that great caution be exercised in assuming that men can successfully monitor 14 complex automatic machines and 'take over' if the machine breaks down" (Fitts, 1951, Riender Happee orcid.org/0000-0001-5878-3472 28 29
